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“Phase transition” between Confrontation 
and Dialogue in the Light of the Concept 
of the Unity Charism
ABSTRACT
In the twenties of the last century the process of building a new type of 
philosophical culture began, based on the sensitivity towards another person, 
the recognition of values and dignity of the person and the search for platforms 
of dialogue and compromise between people. However, it did not gain a broad 
social resonance. The 20th Century became the scene of the triumph of totalitari-
anisms, based on the idea of collectivism and marked by the contempt towards 
the individual, his rights and needs. In the post-war reality environments fa-
vouring the humanization of the culture of coexistence earned a voice, but they 
too did not manage to divert the tendency towards building a bureaucratic and 
technocratic order. In this kind of system, the person feels reduced to his instru-
mental functions, and the dialogue submerged in the world of humanistic values 
becomes a distant and unequalled dream. This text undertakes the problem of 
the conditions which must be met in order for the tendency towards dialogue 
and mutual respect to prevail over the hostile, confrontational approach, which 
characterizes many contemporary social environments. The author suggests that 
we refer to the analogy with the thermodynamics phenomenon, phase transi-
tion, and consider the notion of spiritual energy (the analogue of the physical 
term enthalpy) as an agent regulating the internal disposition of the individual 
to “freeze” or “thaw” relations with his fellow human beings. The key thesis is 
that the most important source of energy indispensable to move from confron-
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tation to dialogue lies in the resources of religious experience- the openness to 
the grace fl owing from the transcendental reality, and the guides on the path 
to discovering this source are the witnesses of faith- among them the spiritual 
heirs of Chiara Lubich’s charism.
KEYWORDS: dialogue, confrontation, phase transition, charism of unity.
Is the need for dialogue and unity a natural property, innate to 
the person? If we consult the philosophers of dialogue, as well as 
other intellectuals of similar currents, who published in the fi rst 
half of the 20th Century, we will obtain an affi rmative answer. This 
view was most clearly expressed by one of the most important 
authors of the philosophy of dialogue, Martin Buber, when he 
wrote: “The fundamental fact of human existence is neither the 
individual as such nor the aggregate as such. Each, considered by 
itself, is a mighty abstraction. The individual is a fact of existence 
in so far as he steps into a living relation with other individuals. 
The aggregate is a fact of existence in so far as it is built up of 
living units of relation. The fundamental fact of human existence 
is man with man. What is peculiary characteristic of the human 
world is above all that something takes place between one being 
and another the like of which can be found nowhere in nature. 
[...] Man is made by it”1. Other dialogians think similarly.2 Their 
1 M. Buber, Between Man and Man. Transl. R. G. Smith. London: Kegan Paul 
1947, p. 202-203. 
2 The fundamental theses of philosophy of dialogue, also known as “new 
thinking” (after Franz Rosenzweig) are presented in the following way by Bog-
dan Baran: “Discovering you [...] brings me to the consciousness of my “self”, to 
my moral identifi cation [...] the dialogical relation is based on speech, its primal 
character – also a signifi cant moment of dialogics – is to be, what is precise [...]. 
New thinking [...] is speaking- thinking, this means thinking, which «needs the 
other». This need is in other words «trusting experience», for it is in experience 
that one meets the other”. B. Baran, Z historii „nowego myślenia”, in: B. Baran et 
al. (red.), Rozum i Słowo. Eseje dialogiczne, Kraków 1987, p. 7-10 passim. Johannes 
Volkelt wrote about “the primal, intuitional certainty of the you realm” and 
the “material relation of the conviction about the existence of oneself with the 
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thought reaches back to the sources of European culture: to the 
Greek concept of “zoon politikon” and to the foundations of 
Judeochristianity, which underline the fundamental role of the 
word in the person’s life and the idea of religion as a person’s 
bond with God and with other people3. Let us attempt to look 
at this problem slightly differently, from the perspective of the 
contemporary cultural situation.
The contemporary person satisfi es his natural need of „being 
together”4, confi rming and acknowledging his self along with 
his project of being, by selecting an environment of people with 
whom he shares convictions and preferences. Simply membership 
realm of you” (J. Volkelt, Das ästhetische Bewusstsein: Prinzipienfragen der Ästhetik, 
München 1920, p. 117), and Max Scheler claimed that “the a priori certainty of 
the conviction [...] that some kind of you exists and that one belongs to some 
kind of community has [...] defi ned grounds in eyewitnessing”, and [...] “initially 
the individual lives far more in the community than in himself”. M. Scheler, 
Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Bonn 1926, p. 352, 372.
3 Józef Tischner wrote about the religious genesis of dialogue according to 
F. Rosenzweig: “What happens between God and the person is choosing: like 
the bridegroom chooses his bride, God chooses the person. The person responds 
to this choice, by choosing the one who chose him fi rst. No one would fi nd out 
about this choice, if it were not for the word of creed. [...] The choice must be 
manifested by the word of creed”. J. Tischner, Spór w królestwie metafor, in: 
B. Baran et al. (red.), Rozum i Słowo..., p. 62. Stéphane Mosès expresses this in 
a similar manner: “The manifestation cannot be explained differently than by 
forms of dialogue. [...] «I» is the answer which was demanded by the question: 
where are you?” S. Mosès, Système et Révélation. La philosophie de Franz Rosen-
zweig, Paris 1982, p. 120. Ferdinand Ebner wrote: “In that the I is a Thou – not 
becoming one by itself, through itself and for itself – it is something divine. But 
in the fi nal analysis that means that it is the word and the love of God, which 
revealed themselves in the creation of man and the incarnation of God, which 
turn the I into the Thou. [...] If man «experiences» God, then he experiences 
Him in man; not in Himself as the mystic believes, but in the other in whom 
man experiences the true Thou of his I”. F. Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen 
Realitäten, Fragment 15. [http://wfe.sbg.ac.at/exist/apps/ebner-online/index.
html, accessed 22.02.2017]. 
4 Cf. K. Löwith, Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen. Ein Beitrag zur 
anthropologischen Grundlegung der ethischen Probleme, Freiburg-München 2013.
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in this or that social group does not suffi ce, because- as Martin 
Buber explains- “this connection only means that all individual 
beings are enclosed in a group existence and encompassed by it. 
This does not mean that any personal relation exists between one 
and another person within the group”5. Only a conscious choice 
of friends and colleagues allows for an authentic experience of 
community. Meetings and conversations in this circle and the 
participation in common actions build his self-esteem, satisfy his 
need of belonging and sense, confi rm the validity of his views 
and decisions. Do we need anything more? As Emmanuel Levinas 
would say, “here is the real life”6. But we live in a pluralist society, 
or even – as some diagnosticians claim – in a network society7, 
within which an immense amount of sub-networks coexist and 
penetrate each other; no other connections occur between them, 
besides purely instrumental ones. To the individual person – from 
the point of view of his social needs – it suffi ces to have one “social 
support group”, in which he fi nds self-confi rmation for himself, 
and he himself provides it to others. As Charles Taylor writes, 
the identity of the self is born each time and is consolidated in 
dialogue with others8, but these “others” form (around the self) 
a close circle of “family and background [...] with whom I have 
an affi nity [...], those conversation partners who were essential to 
5 M. Buber, Elemente des Zwischenmenschlichen . In: Idem, Das dialogische Prin-
zip. Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider 1973. Transl. from Polish edition: M. Buber, 
Ja i Ty. Wybór pism fi lozofi cznych, ed. by J. Doktór, Warszawa 1992, s. 138.
6 See E. Levinas, Totalité et Infi ni, La Haye 1961, p. 3.
7 See M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, Oxford 1996.
8 “One cannot be a self on one’s own. I am a self only in relation to certain 
interlocutors [...] A self exists only within what I call «webs of interlocution». 
It is this original situation which gives its sense to our concept of «identity», 
offering an answer to the question of who I am through a defi nition of where 
I am speaking from and to whom. The full defi nition of someone’s identity thus 
usually involves not only his stand on moral and spiritual matters but also some 
reference to a defi ning community”. C. Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of 
the Modern Identity, Cambridge, Mass. 1994, p. 36.
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my achieving self-defi nition [and] those who are now crucial to 
my continuing grasp of languages of self-understanding”9. The 
more or less spontaneously emerging communities of mutual 
acceptance and understanding between people almost always 
undergo reinforcement and gain expressiveness thanks to their 
oppositional reference to other communities, which are perceived 
as distinct, foreign, competitive or hostile. José Ortega y Gasset 
writes, “we live together and in reciprocity with respect to some-
thing [...] I and the other do something and in doing it we are. 
[...] One of the things that we do, and that is the most typical 
reciprocity and nostrity, is a talk. And one of the things we talk 
about is him or them – that is, about others who are not in the re-
lation «we» with you and with me [...] he or they are those who 
remain outside of this closeness that is our relation. [...] Now, our 
Spanish plural nosotros is exclusivistic. It means that we do not 
announce simply the pure community of the I and the you and 
perhaps other you’s, but a community between the two or more 
than two of us – I, you, and certain other you’s – a community 
in which you and I together form a particular collective unity, in 
contradistinction to, outside of, and in a way against, others. In 
our nosotros, while we do declare that we are very much united, 
we above all recognize that we are other than the Others, than 
They”10. From the point of view of the individual’s needs and 
interests, it is understandable that the individual builds his mo-
dus vivendi by effectuating a sharp differentiation between the 
relations “me” and “us” and “they”, which entails the fact that 
attitudes of dialogue and confrontation neighbour each other and 
complement each other mutually.
There exist many variations of relations between respective 
small communities within larger social organisms, such as nations 
9 Ibidem, p. 35-36.
10 J. Ortega y Gasset, Man and People, transl. W. R. Trask, London 1957, p. 
109-111. 
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or states. In the modern European tradition, a social model has 
consolidated, in which the basic and imperative model of social 
unity, integrating individuals and assigning them a determined 
identity formula, is the autonomous, sovereign state. In the in-
ternal politics of the modern state, the aim is to consolidate all 
citizens and social groups around a common ethic, set down and 
solidifi ed by a number of community-creating factors: love of 
one’s homeland, models of patriotism, offi cial language, symbols 
of unity – the national emblem, the fl ag and the anthem, collective 
memory that generates a sense of community of fate of many gen-
erations etc. In external politics, by contrast, during long centuries, 
principles of peaceful coexistence and principles of confrontation, 
rivalry, sometimes aggression, conquest and subordination of 
weaker states to stronger ones governed simultaneously (the fi rst 
or the latter were invoked depending on the situational needs). 
Only after the tragic experiences of two world wars, the decided 
strive towards elaborating lasting forms of peaceful coexistence 
between states and nations based on bi- or multilateral political 
agreements, as well as on spreading the cultural idea of general 
human solidarity, emerged.
However, one must remember that this is an artifi cial situation, 
elicited not by the liberation of the natural need for universal 
interpersonal unity from the stifl ing corset of oppressive polit-
ical systems, but rather largely generated by the common fear of 
repeating the tragic events related to total war. As time passes, 
this fear weakens – proportionally to the loss of living memory 
of evil, elicited by warfare. Meanwhile, the next generations get 
to speak; they do not remember, nor can they even imagine the 
horror of war, which took its toll in such a dramatic way on pre-
vious generations. The collective oblivion is joined by a common 
lack of interest in the past, since the currently predominant model 
of life focuses on an intense experience of the present, without 
looking back on history and without an excessive concern for the 
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future11. Another attribute of Erlebnisgesellschaft12 is the enormous 
prevalence of interest in one’s own fate and care for one’s own life 
comfort over the concern for others. Although we live in a society 
of crapulence, overproduction and increased consumption of all 
possible goods, this does not urge us to share what we have with 
our needing fellow human beings.
Amongst many needs that we have learned to satisfy primarily 
for ourselves, the need for self-knowledge and self-acceptance 
exists. In order to live and function in internal harmony with 
oneself, one strives to obtain a satisfying answer to the age-old 
philosophical questions: Who am I? Where am I going? What am 
I living for? The natural environment for searching for answers to 
these questions is the philosophical culture of the times in which 
we live. Let us draw our attention to the characteristic evolution 
of ideas in this environment. In 20th Century philosophy, a wide 
and expressive current arose; its representatives grant the indi-
vidual the right to independently constitute his own identity. 
11 “Life is no longer contained as a whole, as a whole which assumes choice 
and direction; it is experienced in subsequent episodes, not looking further than 
the end of one period and the beginning of another – if at all they are recog-
nised”. John Paul II, in: A. Frossard, Nie lękajcie się! Rozmowy z Janem Pawłem II, 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana 1982, p. 244. Agata Bielik-Robson writes: “Modernity 
seems to be weary with history, memory and the dimension of time in general; 
it desires a lack of historicity, oblivion, at least an instantaneous escape from 
the time shackles of existence”. A. Bielik-Robson, Inna nowoczesność. Pytania 
o współczesną formułę duchowości, Kraków 1998, p. 64; “By creating himself, the 
person will not search for «paths which were already treaded by others», [...] 
but will courageously dive into the free waters of a new existential adventure”. 
Ibid. p. 24. 
12 “As a result of the transformation of a society of scarcity to a society 
of crapulence, the human mindset towards life thoroughly changed: from an 
“outward” orientation, directed at assuring life or survival thanks to work, 
social advance and securing one’s old age, to an “inward” orientation: what 
will provide me with pleasure and entertainment? What will make my life 
beautiful and worth living?”M. Kehl, Wohin geht die Kirche? Eine Zeitdiagnose, 
Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1996, p. 39. 
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In this era, the substantial concept of the person13 is left behind 
in favour of the thesis that the person is not an entity, but only 
an existence, meaning that he “is” not, but “becomes”. These 
concepts are proclaimed by Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, 
José Ortega y Gasset, Jan Patočka, among others14. Philosophy 
13 Max Scheler wrote: Of course the actualistic theory is correct to maintain 
that the person is not a “thing” or a “substance” which executes act in the 
sense of a substance-causality. [...] If an act can therefore never be an object, 
then the person who lives in the execution of acts can a fortiori never be an ob-
ject”. M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values. Transl. by 
M. S. Frings, R. L. Funk. Evanston 1973, p. 384, 387. [„Sofern jene Aktualität-
stheorie der Person negiert, Person się ein «Ding» oder eine «Substanz», die Akte 
vollzieht. [...] Vielmehr ist es die Person selbst, die im jeden ihrer Akte lebend 
auch jeden voll mit ihrer Eigenart durchdringt”]. M. Scheler, Der Formalismus 
in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, hrsg. von Ch. Bermes, Hamburg 2014, 
p. 473, 476. Józef Tischner adds: “The substantial notion of the human person 
excludes the human person as the principle of the dialogical relation. [...] Sub-
stance cannot enter into creative reciprocity with another substance. In order to 
be oneself, one does not need anything more than oneself. The logical succession 
of the substantialization of the human person is monadology”. J. Tischner, Filo-
zofi a człowieka. Od ontologii do metafi zyki człowieka, Kraków 1986, p. 67-69 passim. 
14 “When one understands onself projectively in an existentiell possibility, 
the future underlies this understanding, and it does so as a coming-toward-one-
self from the actual possibility as which Da-sein always exists”. M. Heidegger, 
Being and Time. Transl. by J. Stambaugh, State University of New York Press 
1996, p. 309. “To say that the for-itself has to be what it is, to say that it is what 
it is not while not being what it is, to say that in it existence precedes and 
conditions essence [...] is to say one and the same thing: to be aware that man 
is free”. J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Transl. by H. E. Barnes. New York, 
London, Toronto, Sydney: Washington Square Press 1984, p. 439.“[...] unlike 
all the other beings in the universe, is man never surely man; on the contrary, 
being man signifi es precisely being always on the point of not being man, be-
ing a living problem, an absolute and hazardous adventure, or [...] being, in 
essence, drama!”. J. Ortega y Gasset, Man and People..., p. 25. “Man may not 
live in the obviousness of extra-human beings; man must fulfi ll his life, carry 
it, handle it, cope with it. It seems as though man always fi nds himself between 
equivalent possibilities – but that is not the case. There is no equivalence, [since] 
only one of the possible lives is the real life, the proper, irreplaceable life which 
can only be fulfi lled by us”. [„L’homme ne peut être dans l’indifférence propre 
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is joined by the belles-lettres, creating a number of protagonists 
living according to this philosophical project (we can point to 
the protagonists of the “rebellious” American prose, from Jerome 
D. Salinger to Jack Kerouac) and pop-culture promoting the role 
models of idols and celebrities who realize the scenario of free 
auto-creation in their life.
By analyzing the attitudes and models of the protagonists of 
Polish epic prose of the late 20th Century, literary scientist Prze-
mysław Czapliński observed what follows: the subject “having 
discovered the unpreparedness of the past, enters into an un-
defi ned history, in which he must make up himself yet again 
– not only backward, but also forward”15. Today, we live in “a re-
ality in which each person builds his own place in tradition and 
effectuates his auto-emancipation in the future [...] In contem-
porary culture, each person must root himself into tradition”, 
and “today’s penetrator of the past, somewhat of a connoisseur, 
somewhat of a metal scrapper, pursuing his rummaging on the 
landfi lls of heritage, must [...] not only effectuate the act of rooting 
himself in tradition, but also auto-emancipation. He will make up 
himself the fuller in the past, the richer he narrates himself in the 
future”16. The Polish researcher’s observation not only pertains 
to the necessity of taking charge of the task of creating oneself, 
but to one more important contemporary phenomenon: the re-
assessment of the attitude towards the past. In the past, it was 
aux l’étants extra-humaines; il doit accomplir, porter są vie, «s’expliquer avec 
elle». Il samblerait donc qu’il se trouve placé toujours entre deux possibilités 
équivalentes. Ce n’est pourtant pas le cas. L’aliénation signifi e qu’il n’y a pas 
équivalence, mais que seule l’une des vies possibles est la «vraie», l’authentique, 
l’irremplaçable, effectuable par nous seuls”]. J. Patočka, La civilisation technique 
est-elle une civilisation de declin, et pourquoi?, in: Idem, Essais heretiques sur la 
philosophie de l’histoire, trad. E. Abrams, Paris 1981, p. 108. 
15 P. Czapliński, Resztki nowoczesności. Dwa studia o literaturze i życiu, Kraków 
2011, p. 149.
16 Ibidem, p. 146. 
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believed that history can be objectifi ed, by making it the subject of 
scientifi c research with suffi ciently rigorous methodology17. Today, 
our ancestors’ belief in the existence of pure historical facts and in 
their objective cognoscibility is considered to be more commonly 
naïve and utopian, and history ceases to be the collection of facts 
and documents, and increasingly becomes a narration, always 
conducted from a certain – more or less subjective – point of 
view, serving someone’s more or less particular – interests18. This 
is why today, we speak of “historical politics” more often than 
of historical sciences, as well as the diffusion and intersection of 
many different kinds of collective memory in the public sphere, 
which produces essentially different models of the past19. This is 
17 “The main current of the historical school [...] from the times of Niebuhr 
attempts to prop the objectivity of historical knowledge on the scientifi c nature 
of acquiring historical knowledge; that is on the method of examining certainty 
and criticizing sources”. H. Schnädelbach, Filozofi a w Niemczech 1831-1933, War-
szawa 1992, p. 77. 
18 “In the decades since World War II the old intellectual absolutisms have 
been dethroned: science, scientifi c history, and history in the service of nation-
alism. In their place [...] the postwar generation has constructed [...] histories 
based upon group or gender identities. [...] As members of that generation, we 
routinely, even angrily, ask: Whose history? Whose science? Whose interests are 
served by those ideas and those stories?”, J. Appleby, L. Hunt, M. Jacob, Telling 
the Truth About History, New York-London 1995, p. 4.
19 “The way we perceive the past is changing. The positive history which is 
practised at universities and taught in schools, which builds, integrates and is 
state- or nation-creative (often written with this role in mind), showing mainly 
the victories or at least the so-called dominant currents, is in retreat today. Be-
fore our eyes, the old, good history seems to be falling apart, or maybe is rather 
being broken, swept away or devastated by the new social and intellectual cur-
rents which disavow the thus far applicable images of the past.” J. Żakowski, 
Rewanż pamięci, Warszawa 2002, p. 13. According to the German researcher, 
Aleida Assmann, the new approach to historical research creates “possibilities 
of fi nding out how smaller or larger groups, for example, families, associations, 
companies, parties, regions, cities or even nations and religious communities 
«produce their own memory»” that “is reduced to a defi ned point of view, [...] 
it is not the domain of experts (historians, librarians or archivists), it requires in-
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what Czapliński has in mind when he writes that the contem-
porary person must “create tradition”20 himself, and then – by 
making it a point of reference – narrate himself for his use and 
that of others: to build a sense of individual identity, and at the 
same time become recognizable and understandable to others.
If the quoted diagnoses are accurate, it follows that the contem-
porary person faces the diffi cult task of self-defi nition, disposing 
– instead of a precise, univocal system of references, which in the 
former, traditional societies assigned each person a specifi c pos-
ition, status and range of possibilities – of an unlimited multitude 
of offers, amongst which he must make an independent choice, 
guided by individual preferences and criteria. The multitude of 
offers – because also in the sphere of auto-creational actions, that 
is, choosing “a way of being oneself”, a process of marketization 
and commercialisation has been effectuated – which gives rise 
to the coexistence of many different paths of realisation of indi-
vidual humanity within the same social macro-structure. People 
with similar preferences search for proximity and community 
with those, who share their views, sensitivity and lifestyle. Con-
currently, they sense a deepening alienation in relation to those, 
who believe, feel and evaluate the world differently.
The experiences of the last years, replicated in more and more 
numerous societies in different parts of the world, show how 
short a distance separates multicultural pluralistic communities 
from antagonistic ones, in which representatives of respective 
communities treat each other with mistrust, in a hostile manner 
or downright aggressively. Are we witnesses of the dissolution 
of another myth, which up until now set the standards of think-
ing about the person as a being who is not only fundamentally 
dividual attention, contemplation and acquisition”. A. Assmann, Wprowadzenie: 
o krytyce, popularności i adekwatności terminu „pamięć”, in: idem, Między historią 
a pamięcią. Antologia, Warszawa 2013, p. 10. 
20 P. Czapliński, Resztki nowoczesności..., p. 19.
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rational, but also deeply sympathetic towards others, persistently 
striving to achieve the ideal of universal fraternity of humanity 
as one, big family?
Ortega y Gasset claimed that social life in a defi ned epoch 
focuses and is based on a system of collective convictions which 
form a common image of the world: “There is no human life 
which is not constituted by certain basic beliefs and which – so 
to speak – is not raised upon them. [...] Beliefs constitute the 
basis of our life, the terrain on which it is played out. It is they 
that face us with what is for us reality as such”21. In the progress 
of history, these systems of convictions undergo exchange every 
now and then. One of them, according to the Spanish thinker, 
took place in the epoch of the Renaissance and consisted in the 
fact that “in the fi fteenth century Europe had lost its faith in God, 
in revelation, either because man had completely lost that faith 
or because it had ceased to be in him a living faith. Theologians 
make a very shrewd distinction, one capable of throwing light on 
not a few things of today, between a live and a sluggish faith”22. 
The second turn took place at the brink of the 20th Century, and 
its essence is as follows: “The generation that fl ourished about the 
year 1900 was the last of a very long cycle, a cycle which began 
towards the end of the sixteenth century and was characterised by 
the fact that men lived on their faith in reason”. It is based on the 
conviction that “at last man is to know the truth about everything 
[...], he will fi nd that his faculty of thought is ratio, reason, and 
that in reason he possesses the almost magic power of reducing 
everything to clarity, of turning what it is become self-evident”23. 
This generation, whose rational conviction is characterized by 
21 J. Ortega y Gasset, Ideas y creencias, p. 2, 6 [http://www.omegalfa.es/ 
accessed 22.07.2016]
22 Idem, History as a System and other essays toward a philosophy of history, 
transl. H. Weyl, New York 1962, p. 171-172. 
23 Ibidem, p. 169-171 passim.
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Ortega y Gasset has ceased to the next one, living now in a world 
illuminated by and subordinated to different convictions, specifi c 
to the times known as post-modern, post-secular, post-rational, or 
even post-humanistic. What kind of new ideas revive and animate 
social life today? This topic is too extensive in order to present 
it here completely. Let us focus on one property of the spiritual 
map of modern times: we live in a period of radical mistrust in 
great projects that arrange the world according to one and the 
same prescription24. Instead of this, we consciously choose and 
create projects of small and medium range: we feel well in our 
“small homeland”, we cultivate and tend to regionalism (which 
sometimes develops into separatism), we surround ourselves with 
few, but very carefully selected friends, we work more willingly 
in small companies rather than in large corporations, we like to 
get involved in regional civic initiatives and so forth.
We can briefl y track the process of rebuilding the system of 
community-creating ideas by examining the specifi c example of 
the Polish society over the period of the last hundred years. Near-
ly one hundred years ago, in November 1918, Poland reclaimed 
its independence after over a century of ongoing national sub-
ordination25. The basic idea which inspired the fi rst generation 
of citizens of the sovereign Republic was the idea of building 
a great, strong and united Poland, drawing on the best traditions 
of national and state past. However, the possibility of practically 
24 The reasons for doing away with dreams, programs and projects of build-
ing a better future according to the universal prescriptions for an ideal world 
order are explained by P. Czapliński, when he writes: “At the turn of the 80s 
and 90s [20th Century] ensued [...] a momentary end of history, [which] did not 
consist of the demise of history. [...] Because if [...] the historical order cannot 
be foreseen, then gaining control over its future shape is only possible on the 
path of terror towards the present society”. P. Czapliński, Resztki nowoczesności..., 
p. 150-151. 
25 When, as a result of the agreement between three neighbouring world 
powers – Russia, Austria-Hungary and Prussia – the Polish state was forced 
to renounce sovereignty and its territory was divided between three invaders.
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realizing this ethic did not last long, because as a result of the 
armed aggression of two enemies – Nazi Germany on Septem-
ber 1st 1939 and Stalinist Russia on September 17th 1939 – Poland 
once again lost its independence. World War II ended in Europe 
with the unconditional capitulation of one of the invaders, who 
attacked Poland, but the second one – Stalinist Russia – ended 
the war in the camp of victors and Stalin had a deciding say in 
creating the new geopolitical situation of the world after 1945. 
As a result of the three so-called Conferences of the “Big Three”, 
which took place in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam, Europe became 
radically polarised. Western countries regained peace, independ-
ence and went back to building democracy, social justice and 
prosperity, while the part of Europe left in Stalin’s power in ex-
change for his participation in defeating Hitler was pushed into 
a cruel system of terror, oppression, fear and contempt for the 
next half century. Generations of citizens were brought up in this 
atmosphere, growing up in the conviction that every person we 
encounter may be a dangerous, hidden enemy (some actually 
were). At the same time – arduously, slowly, in very diffi cult con-
ditions of risk and sacrifi ce – a new ethos was born, built against 
the will of the authorities in opposition circles. Dress rehearsal 
for the effectiveness of this ethos was the “Solidarity” movement 
in Poland and the historic compromise between the communist 
authorities and the democratic opposition, made on August 31st 
1980. The process of social reconciliation and bloodless decom-
munisation was, admittedly, interrupted for several years (by the 
introduction of the martial law by general Jaruzelski, dictated by 
the fear of military intervention from USSR), but since 1989 the 
process of building a sovereign state and democratic, civil society 
has continued in Poland.
The original project of the new social order was thus fi rmly 
based on the ethos of “Solidarity”, shaped by the inspiration taken 
from the thought of the greatest moral authorities of those days: 
Pope John Paul II, Primate Stefan Wyszyński and the chaplain 
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of the “Solidarity” trade union, Józef Tischner. Soon, however, it 
turned out that a signifi cant section of the society was not morally 
or mentally up to the high demands of the community “of love 
and social justice.” The mistake committed by intellectual elites, 
aspiring to spiritual (not necessarily directly political) leadership 
of the nation, resided in making the naive assumption that it was 
enough to create geopolitical conditions for a truly self-governing 
state to see the spontaneous coming into existence of a perfect 
model for the coexistence of its citizens, based on the evangeli-
cal ideals of common brotherhood, love and reconciliation. In 
fact, the moral wounds which had been infl icted on people for 
too long were still too fresh and painful. The history of the Pol-
ish transformation shows that abolishing the artifi cial barriers of 
political and economic development released enormous social 
energy, which, however, was by and large utilized in service of 
building individual prosperity and looking after personal careers. 
The common drive to compulsively satisfy needs from the lower 
levels of “Maslow’s pyramid” blinded people to higher values. 
A natural division of the population into those less and more 
gifted and enterprising led to a quick economic stratifi cation – 
division into the wealthy, those who have achieved success and 
the poor, who have failed. This state initiated an escalation of 
negative emotions, such as envy, jaundice, bitterness, sense of 
injustice, sense of threat, mental discomfort. A contrast thus grows 
between the emotional hell of those who are left behind and the 
egoistic self-satisfaction of the successful ones. This atmosphere 
is not conducive to attitudes of benevolent interest in the fate of 
our neighbour. Our perception of the world becomes ever more 
narrow, reduced and polarised – either to the experiencing of our 
own injuries and nurturing negative emotions, or to the selfi sh 
contemplation of the fruits of our success. Along with the polar-
ization, the space for the possible understanding and dialogue 
shrinks, while attitudes of entitlement and confrontation triumph. 
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This condition is an inescapable consequence of the fact that 
along with political and economic transformation, the Polish so-
ciety found itself – in the spiritual dimension – in the sphere of 
infl uences of the “liquid modernity” in the sense of Bauman26. 
In particular, this means parting with – maybe forever, and cer-
tainly for many long years – the monopolistic model of national 
unity, built on the appropriation by this or that environment of 
the idea of “Polishness” as a universal prescription, assigning 
exactly one, and refusing all other, alternative ways of realizing 
this idea. However, not everyone is pleased with this “liquid”, 
pluralistic condition of social consciousness with reference to the 
issue of collective identity and the way of understanding duties 
towards the community and national tradition, which it generates. 
In the parliamentary elections of 2015 a right-wing, conservative 
party with explicit, radical views on Polishness ideals and models 
of patriotic attitudes of citizens, who identify themselves with 
Polishness obtained absolute majority, thereby the possibility to 
independently govern. Almost from the very fi rst moment of 
taking over power in the state, the leading politicians of this party 
have been using a language that excludes any sort of dialogue. 
Concurrently, today in Poland no signifi cant power can be seen – 
neither among political families, nor communities having moral 
authority – that would strive to turn back on the road of confron-
tation and build a large platform of nationwide dialogue in favour 
of overcoming divisions, urging people who think differently to 
reach an agreement and working out a commonly acceptable 
model of “unity in diversity”. On the contrary; a striking example 
of a lack of willingness for dialogue and searching for an agree-
ment is the statement given by the leader of the largest opposition 
party, who declared the willingness to build a “total opposition”27. 
26 See Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Cambridge 2000.
27 Grzegorz Schetyna’s statement during the deliberations of the National 
Council of the Civic Platform on February 26th 2016. 
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In this situation, an important question arises: what conditions 
must be met in order for the tendency towards dialogue and 
mutual respect to prevail once again (like it did in 1980 and 1989) 
over the hostile, confrontational approach. The problem is indeed 
not an easy one, since today’s arena of public communication in 
Poland is more than ever dominated by the language of confl ict 
and miscommunication, and bad models – permanently present in 
public and media discourse – become consolidated and take root 
also at the micro-social level, exerting their destructive infl uence 
on acquaintances and families28.
I wish to suggest a metaphor: the dialogic potential of Polish 
society has been “frozen” due to a drastic drop in the “tem-
perature” of trust, mutual respect, and standards of behaviour, 
exhibited in following the convention of civilised relations with 
other people. Every day new limits of insolence and vulgarity of 
language are crossed. Observation shows that the structure of rela-
tions between social groups (on many levels) as well as relations 
between individuals are fi xed on a high level of verbal aggression 
– which is partially spontaneous, but is to a large extent caused 
by leaders of political parties – and people live permanently in 
a state of exhausting, unnatural mental tension. It is therefore 
an urgent task for social sciences to fi nd the minimal boundary 
conditions which, when met, will initiate a “phase transition” 
process, analogous to the one in the thermodynamics of physical 
materials and will lead to the “defrosting” of dialogue. In a paper 
as short as this one, I am unable to give a detailed conception of 
28 Psychologist Ewa Wilk writes: “The divide between «us» and «them», 
«nation» and «rebels» is so strong that it begins to go beyond the merely politi-
cal confl ict [...]. It has become part of the collective psyche. [...] Is it not that one 
begins to avoid family and social meetings if someone was to be there [from 
the opposite option]? Are political topics not given a wide berth, when the 
possibility that an aunt, neighbour, old pal are from «those others» occurs? [...] 
Are Poles still capable of talking?” E. Wilk, Na granicy nerwicy, Dwutygodnik 
„Polityka” 2016 nr 24 (3063), p. 15.
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my research for this discovery, but I will briefl y present the es-
sence of my idea.
In search of a solution, I will fi rstly refer to the notions and 
categories elaborated in the fi rst part of this text, in order to re-
fl ect in this context on the idea of returning to certain solutions of 
the philosophy of dialogue. The authors of this current- in even 
more diffi cult conditions than today, caused by the dramatic con-
sequences of the just terminated Great War of 1914-1918, which 
brought about immense material and moral losses, as well as 
a drastic decline in mutual trust between people- were capable of 
rediscovering an encouraging vision of the revival of the human 
community on the foundation of the “spiritual reality of life”29. 
Owing to endless resources of spiritual energy – as claims Ferdi-
nand Ebner – it is possible to repudiate contaminated ideologies 
(for example those which Martin Buber warned about, by pos-
tulating to follow the “third way” between individualism and 
collectivism30) and regaining “the proper I”, rediscovering at the 
same time the spiritual closeness of “you”. Ebner writes: „What 
is the case with the real I? The matter is very simple: its existence 
does not lie in its being related to itself, but rather (and this is the 
fact on which all gravity falls) in its relation to the Thou. [...] And 
outside this relation there is no I at all”31. Furthermore, following 
in the footsteps of Ebner’s thought, we encounter an evident indi-
cation, where the source of strength is rooted, which is capable 
of overcoming the crisis of trust and its socially negative conse-
quences. In the fi rst and fi fth Fragment of the work we fi nd the 
following thoughts: „But what is by far the most important and 
signifi cant [...] is this: in the form of this relation, the relationship 
29 See: F. Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten [http://wfe.sbg.ac.at/
exist/apps/ebner-online/index.html, accessed 22.02.2017].
30 See: M. Buber, Das Problem des Menschen, Heidelberg 1982, s. 160.
31 F. Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten, Fragment 1 [http://wfe.sbg.
ac.at/exist/apps/ebner-online/index.html, accessed 22.02.2017].
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of man to God fi nds its expression. It is the basis and archetype 
of the relation to God which, precisely because it is, and must be, 
a “personal” one, it can be nothing other than the relation of the 
I to the Thou. In the ultimate ground of our spiritual life God is 
the true–Thou of the true I in man [...] the real I, which comes to 
expression in the fact that I am and that I can say that of myself”32.. 
[...] „Since the mystery of the spiritual life conceals and reveals 
itself in the mystery of the “word,” pneumatology is therefore, 
as far as it is possible at all, word–knowledge [...] in the deepest 
knowledge which is possible of the essence of the word, [one] 
will discern that it is from God [...] and above all from which 
his word draws power to stand against the whole world and its 
powers and principalities”33. 
Following the inspiration of searching for an exit from the crisis 
of humanistic values by building upon the spiritual realities which 
are rooted in the person, let us refer to the historical example 
from before two thousand years: to the events of the day of Pen-
tecost, when “the disciples were together, with the doors locked 
for fear of the Jewish leader” (J 20: 19) and they were suddenly 
fi lled with the Holy Spirit (Acts 2: 4). Let us take this situation 
as the archetype of “phase transition” that we are after. For 50 
days after the events of the Passover, the apostles lived in a state 
of spiritual freezing and paralysis of will, in a mortal fear and 
hermetic enclosure. The descent of the Holy Spirit causes a violent 
and radical transformation: fear and terror abate, the will to act 
returns – and action comes immediately: the opening of the closed 
door, going out boldly towards people to testify with words and 
lives. Opening to the Holy Spirit causes a radical re-evaluation 
of the image of the world: the apostles know now that they have 
received a great value which they must not keep to themselves, 
but which they must share with everyone. At the same time they 
32 Ibidem, Fragment 1.
33 Ibidem, Fragment 5.
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know that this value is “not of this world” (J 18: 36), that it belongs 
to the transcendental order, so it is fundamentally incomparable 
to any of the values of the natural order. This means that all tem-
poral values are subjugated to the transcendental order, which is 
relativized. Each value heretofore recognised as such (life, hap-
piness, wellbeing, wealth etc.) loses its absolute dimension and 
so in a potential situation of choice, it will no longer come fi rst. 
In the name of preaching the Good News everything is worth 
sacrifi cing – and apostles do make the sacrifi ce, giving up their 
lives (they will die as martyrs) and their freedom (they will be 
imprisoned more than once). Their unwavering attitude as wit-
nesses of the truth, taking its power from limitless trust in God’s 
mercy, will clash with two opposing attitudes: (1) indifference 
and cynicism of people such as Pilate, thinking myopically about 
their own short-term profi t; (2) fanatic, dogmatic and formalised 
faith of the Pharisees, who believe themselves to be the perfect 
executors of the will of God, since they obey the letter of the Law. 
For whom among the members of those two categories is it pos-
sible to convert and follow the teaching of the apostles? Only for 
those in whose souls the “phase transition” takes place: for those 
who fi nd enough power in themselves to defrost the ice barrier 
separating them from the Truth. With all certainty these are the 
people (but I trust, not only these), that Buber describes as “full 
of faith”, when he writes: “My rationality, my thought function 
is however only a part, a partial function of my being; where – in 
this or that way – I believe, my entire being participates in this 
process [...], what is more: this process is only possible due to the 
fact that this relation of faith is a relation of my entire being”34. 
A key notion in understanding the mechanism of this spiritual 
transformation is the fact that the spiritual energy indispensable 
for the transformation of the mind does not come – as Ebner 
notes – from the immanent resources of the subject. Its value 
34 M. Buber, Zwei Glaubensweisen, Gütersloher Verlagshaus 1994, s. 17.
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(measure) would be too low to effectively remodel the spiritual 
structure and open the way to conversion and consequently – to 
the stance of love for our neighbour, of understanding and dia-
logue. A necessary condition of internal metamorphosis is the 
gesture of opening to the operation of grace coming from above. 
This readiness to entrust renders the person capable of radically 
changing his perspective (metanoia). Buber explains: “Jesus’ call 
to return to the approaching Kingdom of God engendered the 
work of conversion: the conversion to faith. The person who is in 
need of salvation, living in times of despair is offered salvation, 
if only he believes, that it was accomplished and was accom-
plished in that way. It is not about lasting, but rather about the 
opposite, about a certain turn. The demand and recommendation 
to believe in something that does not constitute a continuation, 
but [...] a certain «leap»”35. Only then does something we might 
call a “spiritual energy balance” change its characteristics fun-
damentally. A man who has experienced an encounter with the 
source of grace, and who makes the decision to “jump”, is fi lled 
with a power allowing him to break through barriers of prejudice, 
egoism, hostility, sense of hurt and the like. 
Finally, we might ask the same question that Nicodemus the 
Pharisee has posed: “How can these things be?” (J 3: 9). Only 
God knows the full answer. But it is within the range of human 
possibility to testify with one’s words and one’s life constantly, 
patiently and mercifully, once one has experienced and opened up 
to grace. This is how we can give God a chance to enter the cold, 
frozen hearts of those who initiate confl icts. And we may give 
a chance for those people to – if they choose to – see and believe 
that love is stronger than hate. This program remains in a close 
spiritual relation with Chiara Lubich’s charism and the Focolare 
Movement founded by her. In a conversation with Franka Zam-
bonini, the founder of the Movement said: „the internal impulse, 
35 Ibidem, s. 20.
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which drives us from the beginning, the specifi c objective of the 
Movement is and will always remain contributing to the imple-
mentation of Jesus’ testament: “Father, may everyone constitute 
unity”. [...] It seems to me, that the real, great problem, as well as 
the real and deep desire of all people is unity, is love. If we lack 
love, the cement connecting people, groups, and nations dissolves. 
Hence wars, famine, misery and anguish, which are nothing but 
the face of a lack of unity. Therefore, how to bring about unity? 
Pope Paul VI spoke of a certain indispensable tool to realize this 
goal, which was used by the Movement from the very beginning, 
accordingly to its style: of dialogue”36. 
However, where the will of dialogue has been paralysed, one 
must begin with enduring work on reinstating the conditions 
that will enable the return to discourse inspired by the will to 
reach an agreement, and not – what happens too often today – 
to discredit or degrade the interlocutor. Waldemar Chrostowski 
notices that dialogue can only be born in a favourable atmosphere, 
assuming fi rst and foremost a spiritual opening of the poten-
tial participants, but also complying with three preconditions: 
“Openness is a spiritual attitude, from which one must begin. 
But openness is the minimum. Dialogue is also not the maximum 
yet, but with all certainty considerably more than openness. In 
so far as openness assumes the will to recognize and respect the 
presence of other people and other religious communities, that 
is, the will to accept them as they are, dialogue must fulfi ll three 
36 La spinta che ci muove fi n dall’inizio, lo scopo specifi co del Movimento, 
è e rimane sempre il concorrere a realizzare il Testamento di Gesù: «Padre, che 
tutti siano una cosa sola». [...] A me sembra chi il vero, grande problema, come 
la vera, profonda aspirazione di tutti gli uomini, sia l’unità, l’amore. Se manca 
l’amore, si frantuma il cemento coesivo fra persone, gruppi, nazioni. E di qui 
guerra, fame, miserie e dolori: che non sono altro che il volto della disunità. 
Come portare dunque l’unità? Paolo VI ha parlato di uno strumento indispen-
sabile a questo scopo, che anche il Movimento, fi n dai suoi inizi, ha adoperato 
secondo il suo stile: il dialogo”. C. Lubich, L’Avventura dell’unità, intervista di 
Franca Zambonini, Roma 1991, p. 116. 
“PHASE TRANSITION” BETWEEN CONFRONTATION 313
premises. The fi rst – is getting to know the partner of dialogue, 
like he understands himself. This is a very diffi cult process for 
both sides. If we want to get to know another person, we must 
assume that he truly wants to unveil himself, and he in turn, 
must believe that this knowledge we acquired will not be used 
against him. Therefore, mutual trust must arise and deepen. [...] 
The second premise of dialogue – is respect for another person 
and his identity. This means accepting him with his entire bag-
gage, also prejudices regarding me or my religious community. 
This may be very painful for me, and I may not even know about 
many prejudices. The more my partner unveils himself, the more 
we fi nd out how much divides us. And fi nally, the third platform 
of dialogue is the reciprocal will to cooperate in those fi elds, in 
which it is possible”37
How can we cause people who increasingly get stuck in re-
ciprocal claims and accusations, as well as in continuous brooding 
about one’s own anguish and grievances, to begin to see again, 
how severely their soul is wounded by a lack of love and trust 
towards another, respect and willingness to understand attitudes 
distinct from one’s own, readiness to forgive and reconcile with 
those, who cause their sense of spiritual pain? “With man this is 
impossible”, we could repeat after the gospel of St. Mark (Mk 10, 
27). In this situation, only one thing remains for a Christian: turn 
to God, in order to (from the meeting with Him) draw strength 
to change the world and human hearts in the direction, shown 
so beautifully by the paradigm of unity built on the model of 
Chiara Lubich’s tireless actions and the movement created by 
her. In order to walk onto this path and follow it persistently, we 
need – just like Chiara – “an honest and full of love, an entirely 
transparent opening to the light of God, which manifests itself in 
37 W. Chrostowski, O dialogu międzyreligijnym, w: Kościół XX wieku. Rozmowy 
Ewy Czaczkowskiej, Katowice 1999, p. 57-58. 
314 KRZYSZTOF WIECZOREK
the truth, good and beauty of the surrounding world”38, but com-
bined with the readiness to accept painful, maybe even terrible 
experiences of rejection, contempt, hatred: “Only the one will be 
able to make of ut unum sint the ideal of his life, who with faith 
in love, which conquers all, is ready to experience with Jesus and 
in Jesus a terrible and from the human point of view impossible 
to overcome trial of abandonment which meets the human life in 
thousands of forms and fi gures. Owing to Abandoned Jesus, rec-
ognized and accepted as the only good, unity ceases to be a mere 
utopia, but becomes a captivating and real history of humanity”39.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, if we ask about the social conditions of the possibil-
ity to transfer between confrontation and dialogue, then the only 
answer that seems to create real (if only from the perspective of 
faith) chances to resolve the problem, is indicating the constant 
presence and tireless activity of people, who live the life “not of 
this world”, and who go out to their fellow human beings, giving 
testimony to faith, hope and love. Because “if we are surrounded 
by a world confi rmed in passions, in the pursuit of careers, devoid 
of ideals, of justice and hope- let us not feel despondent. When the 
One, who conquered death, is with us, it is possible to have hope 
38 “Un’ apertura sincera e innamorata, del tutto trasparente, alla luce di 
Dio che s’annuncia nella verità, bontà e bellezza del mondo che la circonda”. 
P. Coda, Un carisma e un’ opera di Dio, In: Chiara Lubich, La dottrina spirituale, 
a cura di Michele Vandeleene, Milano: Mondadori 2001, p. 18. 
39 “Solo chi, con Gesù e in lui, è pronto a vivere nella fede dell’amore che tut-
to vince la formidabile e spesso umanamente impossibile prova dell’abbandono, 
nelle mille forme e nelle mille volti in cui essa si fa incontro all’umana esist-
enza, solo costui potrà fare dell’ut unum sint l’ideale della sua esistenza. Grazie 
a Gesù abbandonato, riconosciuto e accolto come unico bene, l’unità non è più 
un’utopia: diventa storia entusiasmante e concreta dell’umanità”. Ibidem, p. 
18-19.
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despite all hope” (“se un mondo, come quello politico o sociale, 
incallito da passioni, da carrireismi, svilito di ideali, di giustizia 
e di speranza, ci circonda, non sentiamoci soffocare. Dobbiamo 
confi dare e non abbandonare soprattutto il nostro posto impeg-
no: con Uno che ha vinto sulla morte si può sperate contro ogni 
speranza”)40. 
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